The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments

Synthese 194 (3) (2017)
Authors
Dr. Dr. Skovgaard-Olsen
Universität Göttingen
Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in particular is the preface paradox, which will receive an extensive treatment. As we shall see, the problem of logical omniscience not only arises within theories based on deductive logic; but also within the recent paradigm shift in psychology of reasoning. So dealing with this problem is important not only for philosophical purposes but also from a psychological perspective
Keywords The problem of logical omniscience  Rationality  Inferentialism  Doxastic commitments  Reasons  Psychology of reasoning  Brandom
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0979-7
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