Abstract
According to Jeffrey Brower’s hylomorphic account of material substances,
prime matter and substantial forms together compose material substances,
and material substances and accidental forms together compose
accidental unities. In a recent article, Andrew Bailey has argued that Brower’s
account has the counter-intuitive implication that no human person is ever the
primary possessor, the primary thinker, of her own thoughts. In this paper, I
consider various ways in which Brower might reply to this objection. I first
consider several “invariant strategies”, solutions that do not require any significant
alteration to Brower’s account. I argue that these strategies are unsuccessful.
I then introduce two ways of modifying Brower’s hylomorphic account
of material substances so as to avoid Bailey’s objection. I argue that these
“variant strategies” are successful, but they require that Brower significantly
alter one or more of the main features of his account.