Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity

Axiomathes 28 (5):491-506 (2018)
Authors
Błażej Skrzypulec
Polish Academy of Sciences
Abstract
This paper argues that the accuracy of perceptual experiences cannot be properly characterized by using the particular notion of content without breaking one of the three plausible assumptions. On the other hand, the general notion of content is not threatened by this problem. The first assumption is that all elements of content determine the accuracy conditions of an experience. The second states that objects needed for the accuracy of experiences are physical entities that stand in a perceptual relation to a subject. According to the third assumption, common experiences do not have accuracy conditions that are impossible to satisfy. The above point is demonstrated by analysing illusions of identity in which the number of objects is represented incorrectly. In the concluding parts of the paper, I investigate how an alternative account of particular content can be developed by rejecting the first assumption.
Keywords perception  content  general content  particular content  apparent motion  accuracy
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-018-9380-8
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References found in this work BETA

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Perception and the Fall From Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.

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