Philosophy of Science 61 (4):503-528 (1994)
AbstractThe proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may be selected, and (2) under conditions of perfect correlation a strictly efficient strategy must be selected.
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Pragmatics and Empiricism.Brian Skyrms - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):514-516.
Prisoners' Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem.David K. Lewis - 1979 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (3):235-240.