Evolutionary considerations in the framing of social norms

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):265-273 (2010)

Authors
Kevin Zollman
Carnegie Mellon University
Brian Skyrms
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society . We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the ultimatum game, and show how this ‘irrational’ behavior might result from a single norm which governs behavior in multiple games. We also show how framing effects might result in radically different play in strategically identical situations. We consider the Hawk-Dove game (the game of chicken) and also the Nash bargaining game. Here arbitrary tags or signals might result in one party doing better than another
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/1470594X09339744
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,966
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Diversity, Tolerance, and the Social Contract.Justin P. Bruner - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (4):429-448.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-16

Total views
40 ( #193,404 of 2,235,935 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #367,010 of 2,235,935 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature