Philosophical Studies 125 (1):115-137 (2005)

Authors
Matthew Slater
Bucknell University
Abstract
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism is designed to side-step complaints given by compatibilist critiques of the so-called Transfer Argument. I argue that while it represents an improvement over the Transfer Argument, it loses some of its plausibility when we reflect on some metalogical issues about normal modal modeling and the semantics of natural language. More specifically, the crucial principle on which the Direct Argument depends appears doubtful where context plays a role in evaluation of normative claims.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-7801-1
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References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
Selective Necessity and the Free Will Problem.Michael Slote - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (January):5-24.

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Agnosticism About Moral Responsibility.Jeremy Byrd - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.

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