Philosophia 38 (2):327-330 (2010)

Matthew Slater
Bucknell University
Many Compatibilists seem to suppose that discover that we lived in a deterministic world would not unseat our confidence that many of our actions are nevertheless free. Here's a short story about such confidence becoming unseated.
Keywords Freedom  Determinism  Compatibilism  Symmetry
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-009-9221-5
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,735
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
On Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498-500.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deliberative Alternatives.Dana K. Nelkin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):215-240.
What Freedom Is.Wells Earl Draughon - 2003 - Writer's Showcase.
Global Control and Freedom.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
Locke on the Freedom of the Will.Vere Chappell - 1994 - In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press. pp. 101--21.
Self‐Consciousness, Normativity and Abysmal Freedom.William F. Bristow - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):498 – 523.


Added to PP index

Total views
65 ( #158,697 of 2,432,404 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #170,210 of 2,432,404 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes