Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (4):653-681 (2008)

Abstract
Pragmatism is often thought to be incompatible with realism, the view that there are knowable mind-independent facts, objects, or properties. In this article, I show that there are, in fact, realist versions of pragmatism and argue that a realist pragmatism of the right sort can make important contributions to such fields as religious ethics and philosophy of religion. Using William James's pragmatism as my primary example, I show (1) that James defended realist and pluralist views in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion, and (2) that these views not only cohere with his pragmatism but indeed are basic to it. After arguing that James's pragmatism provides a credible and useful approach to a number of basic philosophical and religious issues, I conclude by reflecting on some ways in which we can apply and potentially improve James's views in the study of religion
Keywords William James  pragmatism  religious ethics  realism  philosophy of religion
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2008.00366.x
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Role of Imagination in James’s and Dewey’s Understanding of Religious Experience.Romain Mollard - 2013 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 5 (1).
Realism in William James’s Philosophy of Religion.Abbas Haj Zeinolabedini & Mohsen Javadi - 2015 - پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین 13 (1):47-70.

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