Seeing is not (necessarily) believing

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):130-130 (1998)
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Abstract

We doubt that theory of mind can be sufficiently demonstrated without reliance on verbal tests. Where language is the major tool of social manipulation, an effective theory of mind must use language as an input. We suspect, therefore, that in this context, prelinguistic human and nonhuman minds are more alike than are human pre- and postlinguistic minds.

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