Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility of inner speech

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):699-700 (2002)
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Abstract

The possible role of language in intermodular communication and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”.

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Peter Slezak
University of New South Wales

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The tripartite model of representation.Peter Slezak - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):239-270.

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