Ethics 127 (3):521-552 (2017)

Authors
Paulina Sliwa
Cambridge University
Abstract
Moral understanding is a valuable epistemic and moral good. I argue that moral understanding is the ability to know right from wrong. I defend the account against challenges from nonreductionists, such as Alison Hills, who argue that moral understanding is distinct from moral knowledge. Moral understanding, she suggests, is constituted by a set of abilities: to give and follow moral explanations and to draw moral conclusions. I argue that Hills’s account rests on too narrow a conception of moral understanding. Among other things, it cannot account for the importance of first-personal experience for achieving moral understanding.
Keywords moral understanding  moral knowledge  reductionism  moral testimony
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DOI 10.1086/690011
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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation.Alison Hills - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity.Michel Croce - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.
Is Understanding Reducible?Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):117-135.

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