IV—Understanding and Knowing

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):57-74 (2015)
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Abstract

What is the relationship between understanding and knowing? This paper offers a defence of reductionism about understanding: the view that instances of understanding reduce to instances of knowing. I argue that knowing is both necessary and sufficient for understanding. I then outline some advantages of reductionism

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Paulina Sliwa
University of Vienna

References found in this work

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
No Understanding Without Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):510-515.
True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.

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