Theory and Decision 70 (3):385-398 (2011)

Abstract
We define an evolutionary process of “economic Darwinism” for playing the field, symmetric games. The process captures two forces. One is “economic selection”: if current behavior leads to payoff differences, behavior yielding lowest payoff has strictly positive probability of being replaced by an arbitrary behavior. The other is “mutation”: any behavior has at any point in time a strictly positive, very small probability of shifting to an arbitrary behavior. We show that behavior observed frequently is in accordance with “evolutionary equilibrium”, a static equilibrium concept suggested in the literature. Using this result, we demonstrate that generally under positive (negative) externalities, economic Darwinism implies even more under- (over-)activity than does Nash equilibrium
Keywords Evolutionary game theory  Darwinian evolution  Economic selection  Mutation  Evolutionary equilibrium  Stochastic stability
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11238-009-9165-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,683
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Universal Darwinism and Evolutionary Social Science.Richard R. Nelson - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):73-94.
Explaining Fairness in Complex Environments.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):81-97.
Cycles Versus Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games.Thomas W. L. Norman - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):167-182.
Modeling Social and Evolutionary Games.Angela Potochnik - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (1):202-208.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-12-01

Total views
36 ( #305,912 of 2,462,448 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,313 of 2,462,448 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes