Oxford University Press (2013)

Authors
Michael Slote
University of Miami
Abstract
This new book by Michael Slote argues that Western philosophy on the whole has overemphasized rational control and autonomy at the expense of the important countervailing value and virtue of receptivity. Recently the ideas of caring and empathy have received a great deal of philosophical and public attention, but both these notions rest on the deeper and broader value of receptivity, and in From Enlightenment to Receptivity, Slote seeks to show that we need to focus more on receptivity if we are to attain a more balanced sense and understanding of what is important to us. Beginning with a critique of Enlightenment thinking that calls into question its denial of any central role to considerations of emotion and empathy, he goes on to show how a greater emphasis on these factors and on the receptivity that underlies them can give us a more realistic, balanced, and sensitive understanding of our core ethical and epistemological values. This means rejecting post-modernism's blanket rejection of reason and of compelling real values and recognizing, rather, that receptivity should play a major role in how we lead our lives as individuals, in how we relate to nature, in how we acquire knowledge about the world, and in how we relate morally and politically with others.
Keywords Caring  Empathy  Ethics
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Reprint years 2016, 2017
Buy this book $14.98 used (76% off)   $17.44 new (72% off)   Amazon page
Call number BJ1475.S595 2013
ISBN(s) 9780199970704   019997070X   9780190649647   019064964X
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Chapters BETA
Empathy and Objectivity

Enlightenment thinking and most recent philosophy in the English-speaking world have downplayed or ignored the role of emotion and empathy in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. But objectivity and open-mindedness are epistemic virtues that are involved in full epistemic rationality, ... see more

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Risk and Asymmetry in Development Ethics.Julian Jonker - 2020 - African Journal of Business Ethics 14 (1):23-41.
Empathy as the Moral Sense?Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):867-879.
Updating Yin and Yang.Michael Slote - 2013 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 12 (3):271-282.

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