Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (4):419-431 (2011)
Joy is often mentioned in discussion of theories of hedonism, happiness, desire, or religion, but is rarely considered in itself. Consequently, much about the nature of joy remains unclear. Is it, for example, a distinctive state? A feeling? An emotion? Why is it experienced? Does it have a functional role? Through discussion of joy's nature, role, and importance, it will be demonstrated that joy can indeed be defined: as an intense, positively-valenced emotion, whose inherent connection to the desire for self-preservation renders it inappropriate for providing the basis for theories of morality.
Keywords Joy  Happiness  Emotion  Spinoza  Morality  Pleasure  Desire  Self-Preservation  Eudaimonia
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-011-9297-6
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