Mineness without Minimal Selves

Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219 (2014)
Authors
Fleur Jongepier
Cambridge University
Abstract
In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we label an ‘embodied biography’. Building on a near consensus among consciousness researchers over the function of consciousness as integrating infor- mation, we argue that the phenomenology of mineness consists in the absence of any further thought on top of the experience itself. Finally we argue that this non-phenomenological account of mineness fits well with existing data on pathologies of mineness such as delusions of thought insertion.
Keywords Mineness  Subjectivity  Minimal Self  Phenomenology  Thought Insertion  Consciousness  Self-Consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Towards a Constitutive Account of Implicit Narrativity.Fleur Jongepier - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):51-66.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Authorship and Control Over Thoughts.Gottfried Vosgerau & Martin Voss - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (5):534-565.
Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership.Timothy Lane - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
The Mineness of Experience.Wolfgang Fasching - 2009 - Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.
Thought Insertion and the Inseparability Thesis.Paul J. Gibbs - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (3):195-202.
Is the Self a Social Construct?Dan Zahavi - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):551-573.
Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 686--696.
Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique.Ole Koksvik - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):321-334.
First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--273.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-09-15

Total views
175 ( #35,792 of 2,313,478 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #17,267 of 2,313,478 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature