Authors
Michael Slote
University of Miami
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DOI 10.1093/aristoteliansupp/58.1.139
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Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scalar Consequentialism the Right Way.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3131-3144.
Willpower Satisficing.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):251-265.
Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment.Iason Gabriel - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (3):411-437.

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