Two conceptions of psychological continuity

Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):61 – 80 (1998)
Authors
Marc Slors
Radboud University Nijmegen
Abstract
In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.
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DOI 10.1080/10001998018538690
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References found in this work BETA

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception. [REVIEW]Marc Slors - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):437-458.
Body and Self: An Entangled Narrative.Priscilla Brandon - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):67-83.
Will It Be Me? Identity, Concern and Perspective.Patrick Stokes - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):206-226.
Care for One's Own Future Experiences.Marc Slors - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):183-195.

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