Tarski, Frege and the Liar Paradox

Philosophy 46 (176):133- (1971)
A.1. Some philosophers, including Tarski and Russell, have concluded from a study of various versions of the Liar Paradox ‘that there must be a hierarchy of languages, and that the words “true” and “false”, as applied to statements in any given language, are themselves words belonging to a language of higher order’. In his famous essay on truth Tarski claimed that ‘colloquial’ language is inconsistent as a result of its property of ‘universality’: that is, whatever can be said at all can in principle be said in it, with an extended vocabularly if necessary. Thus, in English we can talk about English expressions, what they denote, what they say, whether what they say is true or false, and so on: English contains its own metalanguage. This universality enables us to construct sentences which say of themselves that they are false, and by applying the law of excluded middle to them we easily derive a contradiction. Tarski concludes that ‘these antinomies seem to provide a proof that every language which is universal in the above sense, and for which the normal laws of logic hold, must be inconsistent’ . He then proposes to avoid such contradictions by the use of a hierarchy of languages such that statements about any one language can be made only in a different language at a higher level
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0031819100017186
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,777
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421-444.
Liar Paradox.Bradley Dowden - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Denying The Liar.Dale Jacquette - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):91-98.
The Liar Paradox in New Clothes.Jeff Snapper - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):319-322.
Lesniewski's Early Liar, Tarski and Natural Language.Arianna Betti - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 (1-3):267-287.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

105 ( #48,233 of 2,177,988 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #73,516 of 2,177,988 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums