Frege's alleged realism


Authors
Hans Sluga
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
Michael Dummett, following an established line of reasoning, has interpreted Frege as a realist. But his claim that Frege was arguing against a dominant idealism is untenable. While there are passages in Frege's writings that seem to support a realistic interpretation, others are irreconcilable with it. The issue can be resolved only by examining the historical context. Frege's thought is, in fact, related to the philosophy of Hermann Lotze. Frege is best regarded as a transcendental idealist in the Lotze-Kant tradition. His contextual principle is a linguistic version of Kant's principle of the transcendental unity of judgment. By ignoring the historical context Dummett has been led to misinterpret the precise role of the contextual principle in Frege's thought.
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DOI 10.1080/00201747708601832
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References found in this work BETA

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Paul Edwards (ed.) - 1967 - New York: Macmillan.
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Leonard Linsky - 1970 - Ethics 80 (4):322-323.
I. Frege as a Realist.Michael Dummett - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):455-468.

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Citations of this work BETA

Did Frege Believe Frege's Principle?Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 2001 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (1):87-114.
Frege, Contextuality and Compositionality.Theo M. V. Janssen - 2001 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (1):115-136.
Frege and Kant on Geometry.Michael Dummett - 1982 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):233 – 254.
Psychologism and Anti-Realism.Karen Green - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):488 – 500.
Objectivity and Reality in Lotze and Frege.Michael Dummett - 1982 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):95 – 114.

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