Truth and the imperfection of language

Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):1-26 (2007)
Abstract
Frege subscribed neither to a correspondence theory of truth nor, as is now frequently argued, to a simple redundancy theory of truth. He did not believe, in other words, that the word "true" can be dropped from the language without loss. He argues, instead, that in a perfect language we would not require the term "true" but that we are far from possessing such a language. A perfect language would be one that is fully adequate in the sense that it would allow us to state truths and truth-connections without ambiguities and contradictions. Ordinary language and the calculi we can construct on its basis are, on the other hand, always imperfect. In seeing these imperfections, Frege takes up an important line of late nineteenth century philosophical thinking which can be illustrated also by Nietzsche's reflections on language. Frege and Nietzsche draw, however, diametrically opposed conclusions from the thought that our language proves imperfect.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,871
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Seas of Language.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
What is Quine's View of Truth?Donald Davidson - 1994 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):437 – 440.
The Concept of Truth in a Finite Universe.Panu Raatikainen - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (6):617-633.
Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.
Frege on Truths, Truth and the True.Wolfgang Künne - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):5-42.
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic.Thomas Hofweber - 2010 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1).
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
68 ( #87,661 of 2,231,923 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #265,272 of 2,231,923 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature