Abstract

In this paper I argue that the existing arguments for narrow aesthetic cognitivism are not valid. The reason is that the proponents of the view have mostly focused on theoretical debates rather than on empirical studies of the matter. I make my argument in five steps. First, I distinguish narrow from broad aesthetic cognitivism. Second, I specify the scope of the narrow claim and suggest that narrow aesthetic cognitivism is not about art in general but about narrative fictional works. Third, I point out that arguments in favor of the possibility of such works expressing truth do not discuss how truth is justified. Fourth, I concede that justification of truths in fictional and nonfictional works in the end rests on the experiences outside of the work but argue that it is an empirical matter whether belief has been acquired or not. Fifth, I demonstrate that the most recentanalysis on belief-acquisition evinces that fiction is a not an effective vehicle for imparting beliefs. I conclude with a discussionof what would count as evidence in favor of aesthetic cognitivism.