Wayne Martin on judgment [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 137 (1):109 - 119 (2008)
Abstract
Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment marks a significant advance in the philosophical analysis of judgment. He understands that the domain of judgment is so large that it allows only a selective treatment. We can expand Martin’s insight by acknowledging that this domain is, in fact, hypercomplex and therefore unsurveyable in Wittgenstein’s sense. Martin’s treatment of judgments can, however, be extended in a number of directions. Of particular importance is it to understand the linguistic aspect of theoretical judgments, the challenges to the synthetic conception of judgment constituted not only by existential, but also by impersonal and negative judgments, and the exploration of the links between the notions of judgment and truth.
Keywords Wayne Martin  Judgment  Hypercomplexity  Unsurveyability  The synthetic theory of judgment  Existential judgments  Impersonal judgments  Negative judgments  Language  Truth
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Reprint years 2008
DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9174-0
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