A Plea for Things That Are Not Quite All There: Or, Is There a Problem about Vague Composition and Vague Existence?

Journal of Philosophy 102 (8):381-421 (2005)
Abstract
Orthodoxy has it that mereological composition can never be a vague matter, for if it were, then existence would sometimes be a vague matter too, and that's impossible. I accept that vague composition implies vague existence, but deny that either is impossible. In this paper I develop degree-theoretic versions of quantified modal logic and of mereology, and combine them in a framework that allows us to make clear sense of vague composition and vague existence, and the relationships between them
Keywords vagueness  mereological composition  quantified modal logic  mereology
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2005102816
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Fundamental Indeterminacy.Elizabeth Barnes - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):339-362.
The Argument From Vagueness.Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):891-901.
Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):117-140.

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