Approximate truth and dynamical theories

Arguably, there is no substantial, general answer to the question of what makes for the approximate truth of theories. But in one class of cases, the issue seems simply resolved. A wide class of applied dynamical theories can be treated as two-component theories—one component specifying a certain kind of abstract geometrical structure, the other giving empirical application to this structure by claiming that it replicates, subject to arbitrary scaling for units etc., the geometric structure to be found in some real-world dynamical phenomenon. In such a case, a theory is approximately true just if the one geometric structure approximately replicates the other (and if problems remain here, they are problems in geometry, of specifying suitable metric approximation relations, not conceptual problems). This article amplifies and defends this simple approach to approximate truth for dynamical theories.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/49.2.253
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Moti Mizrahi (2013). What is Scientific Progress? Lessons From Scientific Practice. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):375-390.
Lydia Patton (2009). Signs, Toy Models, and the A Priori. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (3):281-289.
Moti Mizrahi (2013). The Argument From Underconsideration and Relative Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):393-407.

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