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Comment: Minimal conditions for the simplest form of self-consciousness
In Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen, The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders. Heningnsen (2010)
Abstract
Commentary on: Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 7-13, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
What can body ownership illusions tell us about minimal phenomenal selfhood?Jakub Limanowski - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
Dissociating contributions of head and torso to spatial reference frames: The misalignment paradigm.Adrian J. T. Alsmith, Elisa R. Ferrè & Matthew R. Longo - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 53:105-114.
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