Compatibilism: The argument from shallowness

Philosophical Studies 115 (3):257-82 (2003)
Abstract
The compatibility question lies at the center of the free will problem. Compatibilists think that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility and the concomitant notions, while incompatibilists think that it is not. The topic of this paper is a particular form of charge against compatibilism: that it is shallow. This is not the typical sort of argument against compatibilism: most of the debate has attempted to discredit compatibilism completely. The Argument From Shallowness maintains that the compatibilists do have a case. However, this case is only partial, and shallow. This limited aim proves itself more powerful against compatibilists than previous all-or-nothing attempts. It connects to the valid instincts of compatibilists, making room for them, and hence is harder for compatibilists to ignore.
Keywords Compatibilism  Determinism  Metaphysics  Moral Responsibility
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DOI 10.1023/A:1025146022431
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Variantism About Responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.
Free Will and Respect for Persons.Saul Smilansky - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):248-261.
Fischer's Way: The Next Level. [REVIEW]Saul Smilansky - 2008 - Journal of Ethics 12 (2):147-155.

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