Constitution Through Noema and Horizon: Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality

In Patrick Londen, Jeffrey Yoshimi & Philip Walsh (eds.), Horizons of Phenomenology: Essays on the State of the Field and Its Applications. Springer Verlag. pp. 63-80 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Husserlian phenomenology develops around Husserl’s theory of the complex structure of intentionality, featuring key notions of noesis, noema, horizon, and the constitution of objects of consciousness. By virtue of the structures of noema and horizon found in our experience, things in the world around us are said to be “constituted” in consciousness (along with self and other). The present essay explores intentionality and constitution as modeled in lines of interpretation that extend classical Husserlian phenomenology. The resulting “semantic” approach to intentionality draws on the ontology of consciousness, meaning, and horizon, unfolding a “constitutive” realism whereby our consciousness takes its place in the world beyond our consciousness, yet we experience things in the world around us by virtue of noema and horizon. The “logical” and the “transcendental” aspects of phenomenal intentionality appear in due course, within a formal model of intentionality, a model taking shape within a meta-phenomenological and meta-metaphysical framework.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Theory of intentionality.Ronald McIntyre & David Woodruff Smith - 1989 - In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook. University Press of America.
Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.
The noema in Husserl's phenomenology.MaryJeanne Larrabee - 1986 - Husserl Studies 3 (3):209-230.
Husserl's noema and the internalism‐externalism debate.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):42-66.
Intentionality: With or without Object?Huamin Lin - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 27:73-78.
Husserl’s theory of noematic sense.Olga Nikolic - 2016 - Filozofija I Društvo 27 (4):845-868.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-03

Downloads
23 (#666,649)

6 months
15 (#159,128)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Smith
St. Francis Xavier University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references