Delusions and madmen: against rationality constraints on belief

Synthese 200 (3):1-30 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the Rationality Constraint, our concept of belief imposes limits on how much irrationality is compatible with having beliefs at all. We argue that empirical evidence of human irrationality from the psychology of reasoning and the psychopathology of delusion undermines only the most demanding versions of the Rationality Constraint, which require perfect rationality as a condition for having beliefs. The empirical evidence poses no threat to more relaxed versions of the Rationality Constraint, which only require only minimal rationality. Nevertheless, we raise problems for all versions of the Rationality Constraint by appealing to more extreme forms of irrationality that are continuous with actual cases of human irrationality. In particular, we argue that there are conceivable cases of “mad belief” in which populations of Lewisian madmen have beliefs that are not even minimally rational. This undermines Lewis’s claim that our ordinary concept of belief is a theoretical concept that is implicitly defined by its role in folk psychology. We argue that introspection gives us a phenomenal concept of belief that cannot be analyzed by applying Lewis’s semantics for theoretical terms.

Similar books and articles

The Folk Epistemology of Delusions.Dominic Murphy - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22.
Delusions and the background of rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.
Delusions and the Background of Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):189-208.
Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.
Delusions as performance failures.Philip Gerrans - 2001 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).
Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions.Federico Bongiorno - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):720-752.
Delusions.A. W. Young - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):571-589.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-02-18

Downloads
318 (#37,567)

6 months
108 (#7,526)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Preston Lennon
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Richard Samuels
Ohio State University
Declan Smithies
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Cognitive Phenomenology: In Defense of Recombination.Preston Lennon - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].

View all 77 references / Add more references