In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 491--506 (2009)

Authors
Nicholas J. J. Smith
University of Sydney
Abstract
A number of authors have noted that vagueness engenders degrees of belief, but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief: the kind arising from vagueness, and the familiar kind arising from uncertainty, which obey the laws of probability? I argue that we cannot coherently countenance two different kinds of degree of belief. Instead, I present a framework in which there is a single notion of degree of belief, which in certain circumstances behaves like a subjective probability assignment and in other circumstances does not. The core idea is that one’s degree of belief in a proposition P is one’s expectation of P’s degree of truth.
Keywords degree of belief  expected truth value  vagueness  uncertainty
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References found in this work BETA

A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Truth and Probability.F. Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Vagueness and Degrees of Truth.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness and Partial Belief.Stephen Schiffer - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):220-257.

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Citations of this work BETA

Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):379-428.
Probability and Nonclassical Logic.Robert Williams - 2016 - In Alan Hajek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford university press.
Vagueness as Indecision.J. Robert G. Williams - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):285-309.

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