Ratio 22 (1):98-125 (2009)
In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that facts about reasons for action are grounded in facts about values and against the view that they are grounded in facts about the desires that subjects would have after fully informed and rational deliberation. I describe and evaluate Parfit's arguments for this value-based conception of reasons for action and find them wanting. I also assess his response to Sidgwick's suggestion that there is a Dualism of Practical Reason. Parfit seems not to notice that his preferred value-based conception of reasons for action augurs strongly in favour of a view like Sidgwick's. 1.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism About Value.Jacob M. Nebel - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):449-476.
Kinds of Consequentialism.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 257-272.
Ethical Persuasion: The Rhetoric of Communication in Critical Care.Alex Dubov - 2015 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):496-502.
Similar books and articles
Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses.Francesco Orsi - 2008 - Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics 10 (2):19-41.
Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action.G. F. Schueler - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads237 ( #15,501 of 2,178,142 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #54,729 of 2,178,142 )
How can I increase my downloads?