Ethical Intuitionism and Naturalism: A Reconciliation

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):609 - 629 (1979)
I argue that, If one adopts a minimal naturalism (of a kind rejected by moore, Hare, "et al".), One would adopt a methodology which yields conclusions identical to that yielded by intuitionistic methodology (of a kind employed by ross, Prichard, "et al".). I dilate upon the advantages which thus accrue to each theory, And I defend my minimal naturalism against a variety of objections
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1979.10716271
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Roger Crisp (2002). Sidgwick and the Boundaries of Intuitionism. In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism. Oxford Clarendon Press. pp. 56--75.

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