Ideal rationality and logical omniscience

Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793 (2015)
Authors
Declan Smithies
Ohio State University
Abstract
Does rationality require logical omniscience? Our best formal theories of rationality imply that it does, but our ordinary evaluations of rationality seem to suggest otherwise. This paper aims to resolve the tension by arguing that our ordinary evaluations of rationality are not only consistent with the thesis that rationality requires logical omniscience, but also provide a compelling rationale for accepting this thesis in the first place. This paper also defends an account of apriori justification for logical beliefs that is designed to explain the rational requirement of logical omniscience. On this account, apriori justification for beliefs about logic has its source in logical facts, rather than psychological facts about experience, reasoning, or understanding. This account has important consequences for the epistemic role of experience in the logical domain. In a slogan, the epistemic role of experience in the apriori domain is not a justifying role, but rather an enabling and disabling role
Keywords logical omniscience  ideal rationality  a priori justification  propositional justification  doxastic justification  defeaters  higher-order evidence
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0735-z
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References found in this work BETA

In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.

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Citations of this work BETA

Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - forthcoming - Mind:fzx015.

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