Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298 (2007)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
When we say that a subject has attitudes that she is rationally required to have, does that entail that she has those attitudes for reasons? In other words, is there a deep nexus between being rational and responding to reasons? Many have argued that there is. For example, Derek Parfit tells us that 'to be rational is to respond to reasons '. But I am not so sure. I begin by considering this question in the domain of theoretical rationality. The question in this domain is whether, when a subject has the beliefs that she is required to have by the norms of theoretical rationality, she is responding to reasons that there are for having those beliefs. Armed with a moderately clear answer to this question in the theoretical domain, I consider their relationship in the practical domain. When a subject has the desires that she is required to have by the norms of practical rationality, is she responding to reasons that there are for having those desires? Part of the interest of these questions lies in improving our understanding of reasons for action. I will say a little about this towards the end
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
View all 22 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons, and Rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.
Problems for Pure Probabilism About Promotion (and a Disjunctive Alternative).Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1371-1386.
Similar books and articles
Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action.G. F. Schueler - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?John Broome - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.
Putting Particularism in its Place.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 230--250.
Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
208 ( #45,398 of 2,420,783 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #543,487 of 2,420,783 )
2009-01-28
Total views
208 ( #45,398 of 2,420,783 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #543,487 of 2,420,783 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads