Marcus and the new theory of reference: A reply to Scott Soames

Synthese 104 (2):217-244 (1995)
This paper is a reply to some of Scott Soames ' comments on my colloquium paper Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of the New Theory of Reference. Except for the indicated parts added in May, 1995, this paper was written on December 16th–25th, 1994 as my reply to Soames for the APA colloquium in Boston, December 28, 1994. In this paper, I argue that Soames ' contention that Marcus is not one of the primary founders of contemporary nondescriptivist theories of reference is false. Soames presents numerous arguments for his thesis that Marcus did not originate ideas later elaborated upon by Kripke, but his arguments are unsound; they are based in part on a misunderstanding of Marcus' theory and in part on an inadequate grasp of some of the key notions of the New Theory of Reference, such as the notion of a posteriori necessities and the notion of reference-fixing descriptions
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063871
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References found in this work BETA

Language and Time.Quentin Smith - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Probability.F. P. Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Provability in Logic.Stig Kanger - 1957 - Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell.
Modality and Description.Arthur Francis Smullyan - 1948 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1):31-37.

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Peirce's Direct, Non-Reductive Contextual Theory of Names. Agler - 2010 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46 (4):611-640.
Marcus, Kripke, and Names.John P. Burgess - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (1):1 - 47.

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