Philosophia Mathematica 10 (2):102-129 (2002)

David Smith
St. Francis Xavier University
This essay explores an ideal notion of form (mathematical structure) that embraces logical, phenomenological, and ontological form. Husserl envisioned a correlation among forms of expression, thought, meaning, and object—positing ideal forms on all these levels. The most puzzling formal entities Husserl discussed were those he called ‘manifolds’. These manifolds, I propose, are forms of complex states of affairs or partial possible worlds representable by forms of theories (compare structuralism). Accordingly, I sketch an intentionality-based semantics correlating these four Husserlian levels of form—thereby integrating logic, phenomenology, and ontology.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/10.2.102
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References found in this work BETA

Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
Mathematics as a Science of Patterns.Michael D. Resnik - 1997 - New York ;Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Mathematizing Phenomenology.Jeffrey Yoshimi - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):271-291.
Intentionality and Picturing: Early Husserl Vis-À-Vis Early Wittgenstein.David Woodruff Smith - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (Supplement):153-180.

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