On Sinnott-Armstrong's case against moral intuitionism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88 (2010)
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) we are emotional in a way that clouds our judgement, (4) the circumstances are conducive to illusion, or (5) the source of our moral beliefs is unreliable or disreputable. I take issue with the elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that centre on (1) to (3) and (5), concluding that his case against moral intuitionism is unpersuasive.
Keywords Sinnott-Armstrong  Moral intuitionism  Justification  Foundationalism  Emotion  Disagreement
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-009-9168-4
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References found in this work BETA
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366.

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