Perception and belief

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. The second is Fred Dretske’s claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that ‘non-epistemic’ perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’ perception; that the former can occur only partially---i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition’s concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’ force

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,703

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The mystery of direct perceptual justification.Peter Markie - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373.
Perception without belief.George S. Pappas - 1977 - Ratio (Misc.) 19 (December):142-161.
Appearing as irreducible in perception.Alan H. Goldman - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (December):147-164.
Intuitive knowledge.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience.Santiago Echeverri - 2011 - In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience Et Réflexivité: Perspectives au-Delà de L’Empirisme Et de L’Idéalisme. L'harmattan. pp. 14p.
A note on the belief theory of perception.Norman Melchert - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (November):427-429.
Epistemic theories of perception.George S. Pappas - 1979 - Philosophical Inquiry 1:220-228.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
287 (#62,381)

6 months
6 (#200,786)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Translucent experiences.A. D. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):197--212.
Blur.Keith Allen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.
Object Seeing and Spatial Perception.Craig French - 2018 - In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 134-162.
Knowing that I am thinking.Alex Byrne - 2008 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references