Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind

Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press (2005)
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Abstract

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating

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Author Profiles

David Smith
St. Francis Xavier University
Amie Thomasson
Dartmouth College

Citations of this work

What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
Awareness of Abstract Objects.Elijah Chudnoff - 2012 - Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
Phenomenology.David Woodruff Smith - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.

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