Perception and the external world

Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145 (2016)
Authors
Declan Smithies
Ohio State University
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification
Keywords Perception  Perceptual justification  Contents of perception  Epistemic internalism  Blindsight
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0535-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.

View all 50 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemic Significance of Experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):947-967.
No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):157-166.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-02-15

Total downloads
369 ( #10,257 of 2,274,895 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
51 ( #7,014 of 2,274,895 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature