Philo 3 (1):32-40 (2000)

Alvin Plantinga argues that secular evidentialism is false because the criteria of properly basic beliefs are either too restrictive or incoherent. I argue that Wittgenstein provides a better position on basic propositions (e.g. in On Certainty), which amounts to a more psychologically plausible vision of our epistemic foundations.
Keywords Plantinga  Basic Beliefs
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ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/philo2000314
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