Perception, Context, and Direct Realism

In Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

This chapter, which is concerned with the phenomenology of perception, especially the role of content and context in the intentionality of perception, tries to provide an account of the structure of perceptual experience and its intentional relation to its objects. In particular, it presents an analysis of consciousness and intentionality in perception. Perceptual experience is sensuous and paradigmatically intentional. The intentional character of a visual experience of an object is different to the successful intentional relation between the experience and the object. The twin-tomatoes experiment reveals that content alone does not settle which tomato is the correct object of perception. Perception gives a direct awareness of an object in the sense that the external object is itself the object of perception, and the object is actually present to the subject and experienced as actually present in the context of perception.

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David Smith
St. Francis Xavier University

Citations of this work

Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt E. Bower - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579.

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