In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 17-38 (2003)

Authors
Michael Smith
Princeton University
Abstract
We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of Will’, the idea of an unexercised capacity is much more difficult to make sense of than it initially appears. The aim of ’Rational Capacities’ is to provide the needed explication of this idea.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2005, 2007
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
DOI 10.1093/0199257361.003.0002
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 56,016
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.
Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Hanna Pickard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):135-163.
Scaffolding Agency: A Proleptic Account of the Reactive Attitudes.Victoria McGeer - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):301-323.

View all 77 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rational Capacities.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Varities of Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.
Addictive Actions.Edmund Henden - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):362-382.
Weakness and Compulsion: The Essential Difference.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97.
Weakness of Will and Rational Action.Robert Audi - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
Skepticism About Weakness of Will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-06-25

Total views
396 ( #18,258 of 2,403,588 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #33,138 of 2,403,588 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes