Authors
Joel Smith
University of Manchester
Abstract
Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves as themselves; it is manifest to them that they themselves are the object of awareness. Self-consciousness is a form of consciousness that is paradigmatically expressed in English by the words “I”, “me”, and “my”, terms that each of us uses to refer to ourselves as such. A central topic throughout the history of philosophy—and increasingly so since the seventeenth century—the phenomena surrounding self-consciousness prompt a variety of fundamental philosophical and scientific questions, including its relation to consciousness; its semantic and epistemic features; its realisation in both conceptual and non-conceptual representation; and its connection to our conception of an objective world populated with others like ourselves.
Keywords Self-Consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,688
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

View all 325 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Cotard Syndrome, Self-Awareness, and I-Concepts.Rocco Joseph Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
Grue-Sørensen imellem filosofi og pædagogik.Hans Siggaard Jensen - 2018 - Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi 7 (1):115-122.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Subjectlessness of Self-Consciousness.Edward T. Bartlett - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:675-682.
The Subjectlessness of Self-Consciousness.Edward T. Bartlett - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:675-682.
Mirror, Mirror -- Is That All?Robert Van Gulick - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
A Question About Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1986 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Consciousness: Varieties of Intrinsic Theory.Thomas Natsoulas - 1993 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (2):107-32.
Self-Consciousness, Objectivity, and Time.Gal Yehezkel - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):591-611.
Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'.Pessi Lyyra - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-07-25

Total views
52 ( #183,775 of 2,349,666 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #99,573 of 2,349,666 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes