Symposium papers, comments and an abstract: Bodily versus cognitive intentionality?

Noûs 22 (1):51-52 (1988)
The body, merleau-ponty claimed, carries a unique form of intentionality that is not reducible to the intentionality of thought. i propose to separate several different forms of intentionality concerning such ``bodily intentionality'': awareness of one's body and bodily movement; purposive action; and perception of one's environment in acting. these different forms of awareness are interdependent in specific ways. no one form of intentionality--cognitive or practical--is an absolute foundation for the others.
Keywords Body  Intention  Metaphysics  Russow, L
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DOI 10.2307/2215549
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