The connection between responsibility and desert: The crucial distinction

Mind 105 (419):485-486 (1996)
In Smilansky (1996) I proposed an outline of a theory of responsibility and desert, which I claimed both (a) enables us to see responsibility as a condition for desert even in the major apparent counter-examples such as those proposed in Feldman (1995); and (b) represents the ordinary way of seeing the connection between responsibility and desert better than previous formulations. Behind this proposal lies a crucial distinction between two ways in which responsibility can be a condition for desert. From Feldman’s reply (1996) it seems that this crucial distinction was not suffi- ciently brought out in my paper.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/105.419.485
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Free Will, Egalitarianism and Rawls.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Philosophia 31 (1-2):127-138.

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