Authors
Saul Smilansky
University of Haifa
Abstract
The compatibilist position on the free will problem tends to be perceived as clear, rather unitary and consistent even by those who oppose it. This notion is mistaken, and is harmful to the recognition of the weaknesses and strengths of compatibilism. By examining the three main compatibilist positions and their interrelationships, I attempt to see whether compatibilists can continue to hold together the different positions; and if they cannot, which position they should remain with. The conclusions reached are that compatibilists ought to opt for one (‘control’) type of compatibilism, but that compatibilism is only partially convincing
Keywords Compatibilism  Free Will  Morality  Social Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_1991_1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,683
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Does the Free Will Debate Rest on a Mistake?Saul Smilansky - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (3):173-88.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
34 ( #324,650 of 2,462,434 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,313 of 2,462,434 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes