In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. pp. 79-98 (2007)

Authors
Jonathan Simon
Université de Montréal
Barry Smith
State University of New York, Buffalo
Abstract
This paper is a fresh attempt to articulate the role of a theory of truthmakers. We argue that truthmaker theory constitutes a cornerstone of good methodology in metaphysics, but that a conflation of truthmaker theory with the theory of truth has been responsible for certain excesses associated with truthmaker-based approaches in the recent literature. If truthmaker theory is not a component of a theory of truth, then truthmaker maximalism – the view that every truth has a truthmaker – loses its primary motivation. More generally, if the task of truthmaker theory is not to provide a definition or account of truth in truthmaker terms, there is no pressing need for hard, a priori principles stating which truths have truthmakers and which do not.
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References found in this work BETA

Truth­-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 2009 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity.Greg Restall - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Fiat Objects.Barry Smith - 1994 - In Nicola Guarino, Laure Vieu & Simone Pribbenow (eds.), Parts and Wholes: Conceptual Part-Whole Relations and Formal Mereology, 11th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Amsterdam, 8 August 1994, Amsterdam:. Amsterdam: European Coordinating Committee for Artificial Intelligence. pp. 14-22.
Questions: An Essay in Daubertian Phenomenology.Karl Schuhmann & Barry Smith - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (3):353-384.
A Discussion of a Certain Type of Negative Proposition.Raphael Demos - 2016 - Philosophical Inquiry 40 (3-4):192-200.

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Citations of this work BETA

We Don’T Need No Explanation.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):903-921.
How Negative Truths Are Made True.Aaron M. Griffith - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):317-335.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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