In Paul Silva & Luis Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Perspectives in Epistemology (forthcoming)

Authors
Declan Smithies
Ohio State University
Abstract
This chapter provides a critical overview of several influential proposals about the epistemic function of higher-order evidence. I start by criticizing accounts of higher-order evidence that appeal to evidential defeat (§1), epistemic conflicts (§2), and unreasonable knowledge (§3). Next, I propose an alternative account that appeals to a combination of improper basing (§4) and non-ideal rationality (§5). Finally, I conclude by summarizing my reasons for preferring this account of higher-order evidence to the alternatives (§6).
Keywords Higher-Order Evidence  Propositional and Doxastic Justification  Epistemic Defeat  Non-Ideal Rationality  Evidentialism
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References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

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Moral Knowledge By Deduction.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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