The explanatory role of being rational
In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 58--80 (2009)
Humeans hold that actions are movements of an agent's body that are suitably caused by a desire that things be a certain way and a belief on the agent's behalf that something she can just do, namely perform a movement of her body of the kind to be explained, has some suitable chance of making things that way (Davidson 1963). Movements of the body that are caused in some other way aren't actions, but are rather things that merely happen to agents.
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